The world will never forget the position of Saudi Arabia, and with it most of the Arab Gulf States and some other Arab countries that have greatly hindered negotiations on climate change before and during the Copenhagen Conference (8 -18 December 2009). During that time, the Saudi Arabia position hampered, and in a distinctive manner, any significant progress in all cycles of the negotiations, and at all levels as well as in all contact groups and working groups. It had conducted strenuous efforts to thwart access to any positive results regarding the International Convention on Climate. But how will the positions of Saudi Arabia be, and with it the Gulf States during the Paris conference on climate change? This anticipated event carries great expectations concerning its success and results, with hopes that the world will reach a strong and binding international agreement that will put an end to the worsening of climate change and its devastating consequences, which have developed considerably and in different regions of the world. Will the Paris conference witness during the next month of December, an active obstruction by Saudi Arabia and its team? Or will the Saudi Arabia present an attenuated and less severe position from previous ones? Or will it be neutral in order to pass a major global agreement on climate change? These are logical questions, and worthy of discussion and analysis, especially if they result in an Arab position, supporting the climate change negotiations leading to success, which seems an important and an urgent matter. It also seems as worthwhile that it pushes Saudi Arabia away from the adoption of the obstruction policy in the Paris negotiations. However, it is expected that Saudi Arabia will not hold attention to the negotiations on climate change especially that it faces major hot regional clashes. In particular, in relation to the confrontation with Iran, the war against Yemen, the intervention in the wars in Iraq and Syria, and its influence in certain countries of the region, from Lebanon to Jordan and Libya. So, it is normal that these concerns will keep the kingdom diplomacy and its state systems away from climate change negotiations because these issues of confrontations are among its priorities indeed. And despite these concerns, it seems that the Saudi Arabia’s negotiating team will be strongly present in the Paris Conference; and maybe it will enjoy a greater freedom, enabling it to play an active role. And as this team had put several obstacles during the negotiations in Copenhagen, it will probably play the same role in the Paris conference. However, we need to look at the depth of the economic interests of Saudi Arabia, along on the same tight and compact lineup with most, if not all the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council; where these interests indicate that Saudi Arabia will support the commitment of the agreements’ objectives on the issues of climate change. Firstly, the reduction of oil prices policy, and the expansion of the sales market, that made the non-traditional options for the production of oil, such as that of shale oil and the Fracking technology economically unfeasible. On the other hand, and with the declaration of the European oil and gas companies the vicious war on coal, this will open additional areas for possible involvement of Saudi Arabia and with the other Gulf States in the climate change strategy, at least in the foreseeable stages. Which will persist to rely heavily on oil to meet the needs of energy, even amidst the appeal of the major industrialized countries to start a completely fossil fuel free era. This hoped for era will not be achieved at once, but in stages that may take a long time. During the previous period, before and during the Doha Conference (November 2012) there were many perceived clear distinctions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which has enabled Qatar as a host country of the conference to play an important role in negotiations on climate change, mitigating the influence of the obstructions of Saudi Arabia to an acceptable extent. This distinctive status of Qatar has faded completely with time with Qatar’s adherence, along with the vast majority of the Gulf States, under the Saudi Arabia policy umbrella. Also the pledges launched by Saudi Arabia, during the Doha conference, on the diversification of its economy and the national income sources, are at risk of disappearing because of the problems and conflicts in the region; since, Saudi Arabia and all the Gulf countries have chosen to play a role in this risky situation. And amid preoccupation of Saudi Arabia, along with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), will Saudi Arabia and its negotiating team hamper the negotiations in Paris conference? Or will other factors influence as well as its preoccupation in following up with wars and crises’ details and its own engagements directly or through an intermediary to counteract this role in order to help in disrupting the negative impacts on the functioning of the Paris negotiations, in order to achieve the major objectives already set for it? And the last and the most important question remains: what are the positions of the other Arab countries outside the Gulf that will emerge to carry the flag of an Arab position that will strongly and clearly push for facilitating the negotiations? And in order to meet major international positions, and which can be intercalated in the adoption of a strong international Convention on Climate Change of the Paris Conference, towards happy endings of the Conference of Paris, in order to adopt a strong international agreement on climate change, and to save the world from the risks of sabotaging incursions on the global climate, and the consequent disastrous consequences for all the people of the earth. This is what we wish for, and for all humanity.
